home
***
CD-ROM
|
disk
|
FTP
|
other
***
search
/
Shareware Overload Trio 2
/
Shareware Overload Trio Volume 2 (Chestnut CD-ROM).ISO
/
dir33
/
cwru_ct.zip
/
91-610.ZS
< prev
next >
Wrap
Text File
|
1993-11-06
|
4KB
|
65 lines
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
LOCAL 144 NURSING HOME PENSION FUND
et al. v. DEMISAY et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 91-610. Argued January 11, 1993-Decided June 14, 1993
For several years, respondent employers had made contributions to two
trust funds (collectively, Greater Funds) on behalf of their employees.
In 1984, however, the employers ended their participation in the
Greater Funds and agreed, in collective-bargaining agreements with
the relevant union, to establish a new set of trust funds (collectively,
Southern Funds). To help finance the change between the funds, the
employers and other respondents brought an action to compel
petitioners, the Greater Funds and their trustees, to transfer to the
Southern Funds that portion of the Greater Funds' reserves
attributable to the respondents' past contributions. Respondents
asserted a right to relief under, inter alia, 302 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, which prohibits payments from
employers to union representatives, 302(a) and (b), but affords an
exception under 302(c)(5) for payments to an employee trust fund if
certain conditions are met, including that the trust fund be
``established . . . for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees,''
and that the payments be ``held in trust for the purpose of paying''
employee benefits. Respondents' theory was that, unless the reserves
attributable to the employers' past contributions were transferred,
the Greater Funds would fail to meet 302(c)(5)'s conditions and
would thus suffer from a ``structural defect'' which could be remedied
by the federal courts pursuant to the power conferred by 302(e) to
``restrain violations of this section.'' The District Court granted
petitioners' motion for summary judgment, finding no such
``structural defect'' in the Greater Funds, but the Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded for the District Court to shape an
appropriate remedy.
Held: A federal court does not have authority under 302(e) to issue
injunctions against a trust fund or its trustees requiring the trust
funds to be administered in the manner described in 302(c)(5).
Section 302(e) provides district courts with jurisdiction ``to restrain
violations of this section,'' and a violation of 302 occurs when
payments prohibited by 302(a) and (b) are made. The exception to
violation set forth in 302(c)(5) describes the character of the trust to
which payments are allowed, leaving it originally to state trust law,
and now to federal trust law under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, to determine when breaches of that trust have
occurred and how they may be remedied. Language in Arroyo v.
United States, 359 U. S. 419, 426-427, and NLRB v. Amax Coal Co.,
453 U. S. 322, 331, that is perhaps susceptible of a contrary reading
is pure dicta. Pp. 6-11.
935 F. 2d 528, reversed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined.
Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
White and Blackmun, JJ., joined.